===
title: Init — Claims & Contradictions
===
[C1]: Free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. #structural #formal
[C2]: Every event is fixed by prior causes and the laws of nature. #definitional #formal
[C3]: A person can still act freely even if every event is fixed by prior causes and the laws of nature. #logical #formal
+ [C2]
+ [C4]
+ [C5]
+ [C6]
+ [C7]
+ [C8]
+ [C9]
+ [C10]
[C4]: An action can count as free when it flows from the agent's own beliefs. #definitional #formal
[C5]: An action can count as free when it flows from the agent's own desires. #definitional #formal
[C6]: An action can count as free when it flows from the agent's own values. #definitional #formal
[C7]: An action can count as free when it flows from the agent's own deliberation. #definitional #formal
[C8]: An action does not count as free when it flows from coercion. #definitional #formal
[C9]: An action does not count as free when it flows from compulsion. #definitional #formal
[C10]: An action does not count as free when it flows from external control. #definitional #formal
[C11]: Freedom is not the metaphysical power to step outside causation. #definitional #formal
+ [C1]
[C12]: Freedom is the capacity to act in accordance with one's reasons. #definitional #formal
+ [C1]
[C13]: Freedom is the capacity to act in accordance with one's higher-order commitments. #definitional #formal
+ [C1]
[C14]: Moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise in an absolute, same-past-same-laws sense. #logical #formal
+ [C1]
[C15]: What matters for moral responsibility is that the agent's action issues from the right kind of psychological processes. #logical #formal
+ [C14]
[C16]: Agents can deliberate. #empirical
+ [C15]
[C17]: Agents can respond to reasons. #empirical
+ [C15]
[C18]: Agents can regulate behavior through reflection. #empirical
+ [C15]
[C19]: Frankfurt-style examples are typically used to challenge the claim that alternative possibilities are necessary for responsibility. #empirical
+ [C20]
[C20]: Alternative possibilities are necessary for responsibility. #logical #formal
+ [C14]
[C21]: Determinism may explain why an agent chose as they did. #logical #formal
+ [C1]
[C22]: Determinism by itself does not show that a choice was unfree. #logical #formal
+ [C21]
[C23]: A deterministic action can be voluntary. #logical #formal
+ [C1]
+ [C22]
[C24]: A deterministic action can be intentional. #logical #formal
+ [C1]
+ [C22]
[C25]: A deterministic action can be attributable to the person. #logical #formal
+ [C1]
+ [C22]
[C26]: A deterministic action that is voluntary, intentional, and attributable to the person is suitable for praise or blame. #logical #formal
+ [C23]
+ [C24]
+ [C25]
<contra_1>: These claims directly oppose each other on whether moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities / the ability to do otherwise. #fatal #z3
// A: C14: "Moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise i
// B: C20: "Alternative possibilities are necessary for responsibility."
<contra_2>: C20 says responsibility requires alternative possibilities, while C26 says a fully deterministic action can still be praise/blame-worthy, which presup #fatal #z3
// A: C20: "Alternative possibilities are necessary for responsibility."
// B: C26: "A deterministic action that is voluntary, intentional, and attributable to
<contra_3>: C19 frames C20's thesis as one that is challenged by Frankfurt-style cases, creating an apparent opposition between the literature summary and the ass #tension
// A: C19: "Frankfurt-style examples are typically used to challenge the claim that al
// B: C20: "Alternative possibilities are necessary for responsibility."
<contra_4>: The boundary between coercion and compulsion is not specified; they may be near-synonyms or overlapping categories, so the distinctness of the two exc #ambiguity #z3
// A: C8: "An action does not count as free when it flows from coercion."
// B: C9: "An action does not count as free when it flows from compulsion."
<contra_5>: It is unclear whether external control is meant to include coercion, making the scope of the two free-unmaking conditions ambiguous. #ambiguity #z3
// A: C8: "An action does not count as free when it flows from coercion."
// B: C10: "An action does not count as free when it flows from external control."
<contra_6>: The terms compulsion and external control may overlap, but the text does not specify how they differ, so their relation is ambiguous. #ambiguity #z3
// A: C9: "An action does not count as free when it flows from compulsion."
// B: C10: "An action does not count as free when it flows from external control."
<contra_7>: These are two different analyses of freedom that may diverge in edge cases; the document does not clarify whether they are equivalent, overlapping, or #ambiguity #z3
// A: C12: "Freedom is the capacity to act in accordance with one's reasons."
// B: C13: "Freedom is the capacity to act in accordance with one's higher-order commi