Arbiter — The Existence of Free Will

Step 3 — Analysis Complete · auto-refreshes every 5s
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title: Init — Claims & Contradictions
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// === Claims ===

[C1]: The debate concerns whether human beings possess genuine free will. #structural
  + [C2]

[C2]: Genuine free will is the capacity to make choices that are not fully determined by prior physical causes, social conditioning, or random chance. #definitional #formal

[C3]: On the free-will view, deliberation is not merely the unfolding of antecedent states. #logical #formal
  + [C2]

[C4]: Agents can meaningfully choose among alternatives. #logical #formal
  + [C2]

[C5]: Agents are therefore morally responsible for at least some of their actions. #logical #formal
  + [C4]

[C6]: Free will is often treated as the basis for praise, blame, and obligation. #empirical
  + [C2]

[C7]: Free will is often treated as grounding the idea that persons are not just passive products of biology and environment. #empirical
  + [C2]

[C8]: Supporters of free will typically argue that introspection reveals authentic agency. #empirical
  + [C2]

[C9]: Supporters of free will typically argue that our practices of reasoning and self-control presuppose real choice. #empirical
  + [C2]

[C10]: Supporters of free will typically argue that moral responsibility would be incoherent if every action were fixed in advance. #logical #formal
  + [C2]

[C11]: Some versions of the free-will view are libertarian. #structural

[C12]: Libertarian free will requires indeterminism at the moment of choice. #definitional #formal
  + [C11]

[C13]: Other versions of the free-will view are compatibilist. #structural

[C14]: Compatibilist freedom is compatible with determinism. #definitional #formal
  + [C13]

[C15]: Compatibilist freedom requires that actions flow from the agent's own reasons, values, and reflective capacities rather than coercion. #logical #formal
  + [C13]
  + [C14]

[C16]: The debate turns on both metaphysics and practical ethics. #structural

[C17]: The metaphysical question is whether human action can be genuinely open rather than causally sealed. #structural #formal
  + [C16]

[C18]: The ethical question is whether blame, praise, guilt, and desert make sense if our choices arise from brain processes shaped by heredity and environme #empirical
  + [C16]

[C19]: A rigorous defense of free will must explain how agency can be real without becoming either random or fully determined. #logical #formal
  + [C16]

// === Contradictions ===

<contra_1>: C2 defines genuine free will in incompatibilist terms, while C14 says compatibilist freedom can coexist with determinism. If compatibilist freedom is  #ambiguity
  // A: C2 [definitional] (formal) depends:C2
  "Genuine free will is the capacity to ma
  // B: C14 [definitional] (formal) depends:C13
  "Compatibilist freedom is compatible w

<contra_2>: C17 suggests that genuine agency requires openness rather than causal closure, which leans incompatibilist, whereas C14 allows freedom under determini #tension
  // A: C17 [structural] (formal) depends:C16
  "The metaphysical question is whether hu
  // B: C14 [definitional] (formal) depends:C13
  "Compatibilist freedom is compatible w

<contra_3>: C19 appears to require that real agency avoid full determination, while C14 allows freedom under determinism. That creates a tension unless C19 is mea #tension
  // A: C19 [logical] (formal) depends:C16
  "A rigorous defense of free will must expla
  // B: C14 [definitional] (formal) depends:C13
  "Compatibilist freedom is compatible w