===
title: Init — Claims & Contradictions
===
[C1]: The debate concerns whether human beings possess genuine free will. #structural
+ [C2]
[C2]: Genuine free will is the capacity to make choices that are not fully determined by prior physical causes, social conditioning, or random chance. #definitional #formal
[C3]: On the free-will view, deliberation is not merely the unfolding of antecedent states. #logical #formal
+ [C2]
[C4]: Agents can meaningfully choose among alternatives. #logical #formal
+ [C2]
[C5]: Agents are therefore morally responsible for at least some of their actions. #logical #formal
+ [C4]
[C6]: Free will is often treated as the basis for praise, blame, and obligation. #empirical
+ [C2]
[C7]: Free will is often treated as grounding the idea that persons are not just passive products of biology and environment. #empirical
+ [C2]
[C8]: Supporters of free will typically argue that introspection reveals authentic agency. #empirical
+ [C2]
[C9]: Supporters of free will typically argue that our practices of reasoning and self-control presuppose real choice. #empirical
+ [C2]
[C10]: Supporters of free will typically argue that moral responsibility would be incoherent if every action were fixed in advance. #logical #formal
+ [C2]
[C11]: Some versions of the free-will view are libertarian. #structural
[C12]: Libertarian free will requires indeterminism at the moment of choice. #definitional #formal
+ [C11]
[C13]: Other versions of the free-will view are compatibilist. #structural
[C14]: Compatibilist freedom is compatible with determinism. #definitional #formal
+ [C13]
[C15]: Compatibilist freedom requires that actions flow from the agent's own reasons, values, and reflective capacities rather than coercion. #logical #formal
+ [C13]
+ [C14]
[C16]: The debate turns on both metaphysics and practical ethics. #structural
[C17]: The metaphysical question is whether human action can be genuinely open rather than causally sealed. #structural #formal
+ [C16]
[C18]: The ethical question is whether blame, praise, guilt, and desert make sense if our choices arise from brain processes shaped by heredity and environme #empirical
+ [C16]
[C19]: A rigorous defense of free will must explain how agency can be real without becoming either random or fully determined. #logical #formal
+ [C16]
<contra_1>: C2 defines genuine free will in incompatibilist terms, while C14 says compatibilist freedom can coexist with determinism. If compatibilist freedom is #ambiguity
// A: C2 [definitional] (formal) depends:C2
"Genuine free will is the capacity to ma
// B: C14 [definitional] (formal) depends:C13
"Compatibilist freedom is compatible w
<contra_2>: C17 suggests that genuine agency requires openness rather than causal closure, which leans incompatibilist, whereas C14 allows freedom under determini #tension
// A: C17 [structural] (formal) depends:C16
"The metaphysical question is whether hu
// B: C14 [definitional] (formal) depends:C13
"Compatibilist freedom is compatible w
<contra_3>: C19 appears to require that real agency avoid full determination, while C14 allows freedom under determinism. That creates a tension unless C19 is mea #tension
// A: C19 [logical] (formal) depends:C16
"A rigorous defense of free will must expla
// B: C14 [definitional] (formal) depends:C13
"Compatibilist freedom is compatible w