Arbiter — Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility

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title: Init — Claims & Contradictions
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// === Claims ===

[C1]: Compatibilism holds that free will can coexist with determinism. #definitional #formal

[C2]: On the compatibilist view, the freedom relevant to agency is not metaphysical indeterminacy. #definitional #formal
  + [C1]

[C3]: On the compatibilist view, the freedom relevant to agency is the capacity to act in accordance with one's reasons, intentions, values, and character w #definitional #formal
  + [C1]

[C4]: A determined action can still be free if it issues from the agent's own deliberative processes. #logical #formal
  + [C1]
  + [C3]

[C5]: An action can be free if the person is responsive to reasons, able to reflect, deliberate, and govern behavior in light of what they judge best. #logical #formal
  + [C4]

[C6]: Freedom is a matter of the right kind of control. #definitional #formal
  + [C1]
  + [C3]
  + [C4]

[C7]: Freedom is not a matter of being uncaused. #definitional #formal
  + [C6]

[C8]: The ability to have done otherwise need not mean that, holding fixed the entire past and the laws of nature, multiple futures were open. #logical #formal
  + [C1]

[C9]: The ability to have done otherwise can mean that the agent would have acted differently if their reasons, desires, or intentions had been different, o #definitional #formal
  + [C8]

[C10]: Moral responsibility is preserved when the action flowed from the agent's own psychology in the normal way. #logical #formal
  + [C9]

[C11]: Moral responsibility does not depend on the person being able to break the causal chain altogether. #logical #formal
  + [C10]

[C12]: Determinism may explain why the agent chose as they did. #logical #formal
  + [C1]

[C13]: Determinism does not automatically show that the choice was forced. #logical #formal
  + [C12]

[C14]: Determinism does not automatically show that the agent lacked ownership of the choice. #logical #formal
  + [C12]